Happiness:

Positive Psychology and Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach[1]

Eranda Jayawickreme, James Pawelski and Martin E.P. Seligman

Positive Psychology Center, University of Pennsylvania

The question of what constitutes happiness has been debated throughout the history of political and moral philosophy and more recently in the social sciences (Diener, 2007). How can "happiness" be adequately defined and how can it be validly assessed?

In this essay, we hope to bring the positive psychology approach to the philosophical table to enrich this discussion. First we will lay out explicitly what the Authentic Happiness theory of happiness (AH) claims including a major new amendment to the original theory of Seligman (2002). In doing so we will contrast it to an allied psychological approach, the subjective well being theory of happiness (SWB). We will locate both these theories in the trichotomous space that encompasses all approaches to happiness; Liking, Wanting, and Needing theories. We will then contrast AH to Martha Nussbaum's "Capabilities" theory (C), and use her critique of AH to specify more exactly what AH claims and most importantly what it does not claim.

Positive Psychology and the Study of Well-Being

[1] We thank the editors of this volume for the opportunity to contribute to this volume. Many people offer valuable comments during the preparation of this chapter, and we are particularly grateful to Samuel Freeman, Barry Schwartz, Clark McCauley and Erik Angner.

In the past decade, there has been a burgeoning of work on well-being in the social sciences, and especially in the fields of economics and psychology. (We use "well being" and "happiness" interchangeably in this essay, and we also use the term "theory" in a relaxed way, interchangeably with "approach." This is merely a matter of convenience and we overlook for now the fact that significant distinctions are worth making among these terms.) In this chapter, we will focus on the emergence of positive psychology and its implications for philosophically-based approaches to happiness. While psychology has concerned itself largely with healing--repairing damage and fixing disorders or malfunctioning in individuals--a number of psychologists have claimed that equal emphasis should be placed on happiness, thriving, flourishing and well being (see Allport, 1961, Maslow, 1968, Rogers, 1961, Jahoda, 1958 for mid century predecessors). This focus is not brand new and we do not have space for an historical treatment of psychological approaches to happiness; Peterson and Seligman (2004) and McMahon (2005) are adequate places for the historically minded scholar to begin. Positive Psychology has as its goal the creation of "a psychology of positive human functioning…that achieves a scientific understanding and effective interventions to build thriving individuals, families and communities (Seligman, 2002).

The hope for positive psychology's role in the 21st century can be compared with John Dewey's hopes when he delivered the 1899 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association. Dewey believed that psychology as a discipline should be able, in its unique position as a social science committed to understanding human behavior, to contribute to the value of human life. Psychological practice for Dewey should be judged "by the contribution which they make to the value of the human life,"

(Dewey, 2000) and assist in the development of flourishing communities. One hundred years after Dewey, the theme of Seligman's presidency of the same organization was that merely repairing damage and removing the disabling conditions of life is not the only way to contribute to the value of human life and that well being; that happiness is not the mere absence of depression, anxiety, anger, suffering, mental illness, disorder and the like.

> (In this millennium), the social and behavioral sciences can play an enormously important role. They can articulate a vision of the good life that is empirically sound while being understandable and attractive. They can show what actions lead to well being, to positive individuals, and to thriving communities. Psychology should be able to document what kinds of families result in children who flourish, what work settings support the greatest satisfaction among workers, what policies result in the strongest civic engagement, and how people's lives can be most worth living.
>
> (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p.3)

The Authentic Happiness theory of Happiness

What is the theory behind this vision?

Seligman (2002) proposed a theory in which the unwieldy notion of "happiness" is given up: "Happiness" and "well-being" are merely overarching terms that his view describe the goals of the whole Positive Psychology enterprise. As constructs they play no role in the theory, just as the term 'cognition" labels a scientific enterprise within psychology, but itself plays no role other than labeling in the theories of cognitive psychology. In the original theory (Seligman, 2002) "happiness" is decomposed into

three more scientifically manageable components**: positive emotion (the pleasant life), engagement (the engaged life), and meaning (the meaningful life).** This trichotomy is not claimed to be exclusive or exhaustive at this point, but rather a first approximation toward a scientifically useable unpacking of "happiness." The theory also relies on a set of empirical and analytic methods for moving the trichotomy toward becoming more exclusive and exhaustive (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). With the amendment introduced below, we will call this the "Authentic Happiness" theory (AH) of happiness. It has no privileged or official claim to be the "Positive Psychology" theory, and indeed we will contrast AH to a first cousin, the "Subjective Well Being" theories (SWB) of happiness associated with Daniel Kahneman and with Ed Diener, and then we will contrast it to to the Capabilities theory (C) of Martha Nussbaum.

The Pleasant Life

The pleasant life is what hedonic theories of happiness are about. This life consists in successfully pursuing positive emotion about the present, past, and future, having as much as possible (and as little negative emotion) and learning the skills that amplify the intensity and duration of the positive emotions and diminish the negative emotions. The positive emotions about the past include satisfaction, contentment, fulfillment, pride, and serenity, and researchers have developed gratitude and forgiveness exercises that enhance positive emotion about the past. (e.g., Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005; McCullough, 2000; Seligman et al., 2005, 2006). Positive emotions about the future include hope and optimism, faith, trust, and confidence, and these emotions,

especially hope and optimism; these are learnable and are well documented to buffer against depression (Seligman, 1991, Seligman, 2002).

Positive emotions about the present are called in ordinary language the "pleasures." The pleasures are comprised of bodily pleasures and higher pleasures. The bodily pleasures are momentary positive emotions that come through the senses: delicious tastes and smells, sexual feelings, moving your body well, delightful sights and sounds. The higher pleasures are also momentary, they are set off by events more complicated and more learned than sensory ones, and they are defined by the feelings they bring about: ecstasy, rapture, thrill, bliss, gladness, mirth, glee, fun, ebullience, comfort, amusement, relaxation and the like. The pleasures, like the positive emotions about the past and the future, are at rock bottom subjective. The final judge is "whoever lives inside a person's skin." A great deal of research has shown that a variety of subjective measures of positive emotion are repeatable, stable across time, and consistent across situations, i.e., useful tools of respectable science.[2]

---

[2] For related attempts at defining indifference see R. Nozick (1997). Socratic puzzles. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, pp. 93-95; and Kahneman, D. (2000). Experienced utility and objective happiness: A moment-based approach. In D. Kahneman, & A. Tversky, (Eds.) Choices, values and frames. New York: Cambridge University Press and the Russell Sage Foundation; and F. W. Irwin (1971). Intentional behavior and motivation: A cognitive theory, Philadelphia: Lippincott. Other definitions than preference or pleasant subjectivity are possible, such as removing obstacles defining relief from the negative

What does "positive" mean in the phrase "positive emotion" and "positive psychology? Simply put it means "north of indifference." More rigorously, we define "neutral" as the set of all circumstances, 0's, any member of which when added to any event, does not make that configuration more preferred or dispreferred (approached or avoided) and does not increase or decrease the felt emotion about that events. Configurations that are preferred to 0's (neutrality rigorously operationalized) so defined (and that elicit more subjective positive emotion, e.g., pleasure, happiness, joy, satisfaction than the 0's) are positive, and circumstances that are not preferred to 0's so defined (and that elicit more subjective negative emotion than the O's) are negative[3].

The Engaged Life

The second "happy" life in PP theory is the engaged life, a life that successfully pursues engagement, involvement and absorption in the domains of work, intimate relations, and leisure (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). *Flow* is Csikszentmihalyi's term for the psychological state that accompanies highly engaging activities. Importantly this state is structurally opposite of positive emotion, since it is characterized by the absence of feeling: 80% of people who report being in flow in an activity report no feelings or thoughts during the activity (Fava, 2005). We call this state, "flow," "gratification" or "enjoyment", but unlike the positive emotions, these are subjective but are not defined by

---

and creating enhancements as defining movement toward the positive, but space does not permit full discussion here.

[3] Whether a particular configuration or circumstance is viewed as "negative" or "positive" would depend on the extent to which it would improve or worsen an individual's *current* status. Thanks to Erik Angner for this point.

feelings. Rather they are the concomitants of activities we like doing—listening to music, reading, rock-climbing, dancing, good conversation, volleyball, or playing bridge, for example. The gratifications absorb and engage us fully, they block self-consciousness, they block felt emotion (except in retrospect—"wow, that was fun!"), they create a state in which time stops and concentration is total. We suspect that the absence of thought and feeling is not an accident, but that the intense concentration required for flow parasitizes all the cognitive and emotional resources normally deployed elsewhere.

Activity (behavior) is necessary for the state of flow and unlike positive emotions which have shortcuts (drugs, shopping, masturbation) there is no known shortcut to the subjective state of flow: one must engage in the relevant activity. Notice thereby a structural, epistemological difference in the definition and measurement of Engagement from those of Positive Emotion. Positive emotion is defined by the presence of a subjective feeling and nothing else. The feeling is dispositive. Engagement is defined by the joint presence of a subjective state (total concentration, loss of self, time stopping, centeredness, feeling at home, etc.) and engagement in an activity. If I claimed to be in flow, while doing nothing, or while doing any number of activities, one might doubt (although not definitively disprove) that I was in flow. This difference, we will note later, elevates the definition and measurement of flow above the mere phenomenology.

Seligman (2002) proposed an empirical hypothesis that forms a bridge to Nussbaum's Capabilities theory: that one way to have more engagement and flow is to identify one's highest talents and strengths ("signature strengths") and then use these strengths more to meet appropriate challenges. A well-validated system of identifying

signature strengths is in place (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; www.authentichappiness.org). This was the outcome of a massive project of categorizing universally valued strengths and virtues, which resulted in a classification system made up of 24 character strengths, organized under six core virtues (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The six core virtues identified were *wisdom* (e.g., love of learning, creativity), *courage* (e.g., bravery), *humanity* (e.g., kindness); *justice* (e.g., fairness), *temperance* (e.g., forgiveness) and *transcendence* (e.g., religiousness/spirituality). Again these categories are not exhaustive or exclusive, but only a first approximation of a classification that builds in its own methodology for improvement and revision.

Among the philosophically relevant empirical findings that have issued from this project: the character strengths of hope, zest, gratitude, love, and curiosity have been shown to be most strongly and robustly linked to life satisfaction, while more cerebral virtues such as love of learning on the other hand—the ones Aristotle considered to be supreme and most conducive to happiness—seem to be only weakly associated with life satisfaction (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004; Diener, 2007). Overall, however, this classification is as old as Aristotle and consonant with contemporary notions such as Rogers's (1951) ideal of the fully functioning person, Maslow's (1971) concept of self-actualization, and Ryan and Deci's (2000) self-determination theory. Christopher Peterson calls it “Aristotle with seven point scales.”

The Meaningful Life

The third “happy” life in PP theory involves the pursuit of purpose. This life consists in using one's signature strengths and talents to belong to and serve something

that one believes is bigger than the self. There are a large number of such “positive institutions” which can be so serve: religion, politics, family, community, and nation, for example. Regardless of the particular institution one serves in order to establish a meaningful life, doing so produces a sense of satisfaction and the belief that one has lived well (Myers, 1992; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). Such activities produce a subjective sense of meaning and they are strongly correlated with “happiness” and “life satisfaction” (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005; Peterson, Seligman & Park, 2005). A consistent theme throughout meaning-making research is that the people who achieve the greatest benefits are those who use meaning to transform the perceptions of their circumstances from unfortunate to fortunate (McAdam, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997; Pennebaker, 1993).

Notice an important epistemological aspect of “meaning” in PP theory. It is more than a subjective state, much more. A subjective sense of meaning (“That was such a meaningful conversation we had on LSD last night”) is neither necessary nor sufficient for meaning. The subjective state of meaningfulness is not privileged or dispositive for the presence of meaning (King, 2003). Abraham Lincoln’s life was meaningful, even if in his melancholy he failed to judge it as such (Shenk, 2006). So meaning is assessed by some combination of societal judgment, factual consequences, and subjective state. Again this methodological pluralism will loom large when we contrast SWB theory to AH theory.

This is where AH theory stood from 2002 until now.

<u>The Achieving Life,</u>

We now add a fourth form of happiness. We do so with great reluctance, since parsimony is crucial to good science. We have, however, become convinced, kicking and screaming, that the three lives above are not close to exhaustive, and that there is a fourth form of life which has an adequate claim on “happiness” and which is not reducible to the other three.

Thales thought that everything was water.

Aristotle thought that all people acted to achieve happiness.

Nietzsche thought that all people acted to get power.

Freud thought that all motivation was to avoid anxiety.

All of these giants claimed: monisms, in which all motivation reduced to one thing. This passed the parsimony test, getting the most mileage from the fewest variables. But there is also a lower limit on parsimony: when there are too few variables to explain the phenomena in question, nothing is explained. One variable proved to be too few for each of these venerable theories.

In Authentic Happiness (2002), Seligman sought to analyze the scientifically unwieldy term “happiness” into the three measurable and buildable elements we just reviewed

- The Pleasant Life which consists in having as much positive emotion as possible and learning the skills to prolong and intensify pleasures
- The Engaged Life which consists in knowing your signature strengths and recrafting your work, love, friendship, play, and parenting to use them as much as possible

- The Meaningful Life which consists in using your signature strengths to belong to and to serve something that you believe is larger than just your self.

These three are at least one too few. In selecting the basic elements of "happiness", we hold that any prospective "pathway to happiness" should fulfill the following criteria. While not exhaustive, we believe that such criteria should include at least the following:

1. Pervasive
    a. A prospective pathway should be followed by a large number of persons as a way of attaining happiness/ well-being
    b. It should not be limited to one institution, culture, or epoch.
    c. Descriptions of the pathway should be explicit in the literature of major cultures.

2. Agency
    a. The pathway should acknowledge human agency.
    b. Individuals should accept this life as the type of life that rational, informed agents would choose

3. Irreducibility
    a. The pathway must not be subsumable under or resolvable into any other pathway(s).
    b. One implication of this would be that individuals can follow this pathway even if they did not reap the benefits offered by the other pathways.

4. Measurable effects.

   a. Effects must be reliably measurable.

   b. Effects must be psychometrically distinguishable from effects of other pathways.

The Need for a Fourth Pathway

The failure of exhaustiveness in the AH theory became apparent to in two domains. First Seligman plays a lot of serious duplicate bridge. Some fine bridge players play to improve, to learn, to solve problems, and to be in flow. When they win, great, but when they lose—if they played well—almost great. This kind of bridge playing can be construed as reducible to the Engaged Life. Others play only to win. For them no matter how well they play, if they lose it's devastating; if they win, it's great. It does not seem that winning for them reduces to pleasure (many of the stonier experts deny feeling anything at all when they win and quickly rush on to the next game, or play backgammon until another bridge game assembles), nor does it reduce to engagement, since defeat nullifies the experience so easily, nor is it about meaning or purpose, since bridge is not about anything remotely larger than the self.

The second example in which a need for The Achieving Life becomes apparent is winning for winning's sake. This can be seen in the pursuit of great wealth for its own sake. Some captains of industry and commerce pursue wealth and then give much of it

away, in astonishing and huge gestures of philanthropy. John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie set the model, and Bill Gates and Warren Buffet are contemporary paragons of this virtue: Rockefeller and Carnegie both spent the second half of their lives giving large swaths of their fortunes away to science and medicine, culture and education. These people create meaning later in life from early lives of achieving.

In contrast to these "donors of wealth," there are the mere "accumulators of wealth." They believe that the person "who dies with most toys wins." Their lives are built around winning. When they lose, it's devastating, and they do not give their toys away except in the service of winning more.

Therefore we now amend AH theory to postulate a fourth and different road to "happiness."

- **The Achieving Life. A life dedicated to achieving for the sake of achievement**

We fully recognize that such a life is almost never seen in its pure state (nor are any of the other three lives). People who lead the Achieving Life are often absorbed in what they do, they often pursue pleasure avidly and feel positive emotion (however evanescent) when they win, and they may win partly in service of something larger. Nevertheless, we now hypothesize that these are the four basic and distinguishable elements and we believe that this amendment makes PP theory rather closer to an exhaustive account of what ordinary language calls "happiness."[4]

[4] To point to a parallel in a philosophical discussion of well-being, Scanlon (1996) argues that that one determinant of well-being is the extent to which an individual's degree of success in achieving his or her main ends in life (p. 177).

The addition of a fourth life should underscore that we are trying to describe, not prescribe, what people actually do to achieve well being (see below). Adding the fourth life in no way endorses this life nor do we suggest that you should divert your own path to well being to win more.. Rather we include it to describe human approach behavior. more comprehensively.

We have been attempting to measure the four pursuits separately. Chris Peterson and Martin Seligman have created the Authentic Happiness Inventory and the Approaches to Happiness Questionnaire (www.authentichappiness.org) to include achievement questions, along with pleasure, engagement, and meaning assessments. We find that all four correlate quite highly and positively, but we believe this might be an artifact using wholly self report questions: when mood (positive emotion) is good this may drive rosy self reports of engagement, meaning, and achievement (and conversely when mood is bad). Since we believe achievement and meaning are not completely defined by self-reported subjective states (you can be wrong in your belief that this conversation is meaningful or that your life is a failure) we will need to develop more objective tests of achievement and meaning.

Distinctive Claims of AH Theory

Pluralism of Content. The act of giving up "happiness" and "well-being" except as a label for a field is emblematic of a central claim of AH: "Happiness" comes by many routes. It is plural: decomposable into positive emotion, engagement, meaning, and now achievement. There are no necessary and jointly sufficient criteria for happiness's

presence or absence. Rather it decomposes into the four desiderata above, which are measured and built differently, and which can come together, separately, or not at all.

Pluralism of this sort should not surprise the philosopher. It is central to Wittgenstein's (1952) discussion of family resemblances and a needed antidote to necessary-and-sufficiency-seeking for such philosophical chestnuts as the "good," "free will," the "good life," "truth" and "virtue."

Pluralism of Method. Note also that AH theory is epistemologically plural. The relevant subject state is dispositive (necessary and sufficient) for the positive emotions. But the relevant subjective states (time stops, feeling centered and intense concentration) all bear on the evaluation of flow, but are neither necessary nor sufficient for validly judging flow to be present or absent. Engaging in relevant activities and using signature strength (a behavioral criterion) also bear on the validity of the assessment. Meaning and achievement both have subjective states commonly attached to them, but these can be mistaken, even delusional, so more objective methods of assessing how much meaning and achievement an individual has must be created. This methodological pluralism is the hallmark of the difference between AH theory and SWB theory, in which the presence of the subjective state is necessary and sufficient for "happiness."

Descriptive and Not Prescriptive. AH theory does not tell people what they ought to do. Its subject matter is indeed what is prescribed—across cultures and even universally in some cases—but its role is merely to describe accurately what is prescribed using rigorous classification, valid and reliable assessment, and the discovery of interventions that build what is prescribed in any given culture or across cultures. PP

descriptions surely bear upon and inform what one ought to do and what form public policy ought to take, but in quite a weak sense.

The science of psychopathology is an exact analogy. Consider suicide for example. When well done, the science of psychopathology describes suicide's etiology, its genetics, common precipitating events, the sex ratio, the role of hopelessness and alcoholism, its diagnosis, its intentionality and lethality, interventions that do and do not work, and much more. This information bears upon and informs what individuals and bodies politic *ought to do* if they wish to curtail suicide. *This information, however, does not tell that that they ought to want to curtail suicide.* That judgment is external to PP theory. The information can in fact be used in exactly the opposite way—to increase suicide, if that is what the individual or public policy believes it ought to do. Like curtailing suicide, however, building positive emotion, engagement, meaning, strength and virtue are ubiquitously prescribed across the planet. So AH describes and informs what is widely prescribed. But what demonstrates that PP is only a description and not a prescription is the fact that the information the science yields is just as useful for destroying these states as for nurturing them. The addition of achievement for achievement's sake underscores the non-prescriptive nature of the theory. Seligman finds cheating at cards to win the very depth of immorality, yet we still include it as a pathway to happiness.

Good and Evil; Justice and Injustice. By the same logic, AH theory is not a moral theory. It does not tell us what is right or wrong, good or evil, fair or unfair. Imagine a sado-masochist who comes to savor serial killing and derives great pleasure. Imagine a

hit man who derives enormous gratification from stalking and slaying. Imagine a terrorist, who attached to al Qaeda, flies a hijacked plane into the Trade Towers. Imagine bridge players who win by cheating. Can these people be said to have achieved the pleasant life, the engaged life, the meaningful life, and the achieving life respectively?

The answer is ‘yes.’ Unless one begs the question by having only achievement, meaning, and engagement that one approves of as criterial, this is a morally neutral theory. We, of course, condemn the actions above, but on grounds independent of PP theory. The actions are morally despicable, but AH is not an ethical theory, a political theory, or a world-view. It is a just a description. We strongly believe that science is morally neutral (but ethically informative) and so our theory *describes* what the pleasant life, the engaged life, the meaningful life, and the achieving life are. It *describes* how to get these lives and what the consequences of living them are. It does not *prescribe* these lives for you, nor does it, qua theory, value any one of these lives above the others.

It would be disingenuous to deny that we personally value the meaningful life above the engaged life, which, in turn, we value above the pleasant life, and that we regard the achieving life somewhat askance. But the grounds for our so valuing these lives are based on grounds external to the theory.

The Modesty of the Theory. This is far from a “fell swoop” theory. Its scope is the empirical analysis and discovery of interventions that build positive emotion, engagement, meaning, and achievement. As above, it is not a moral theory, it is not a theory of truth, it is not a theory of justice, it is not a theory of public policy, and it is not a theory of beauty—although it bears on and may inform all these great issues. We

cannot resist saying that part of what alienates us from classical and contemporary philosophy is the habit of sheer grandiosity in its theory making. Aristotle wanted to solve the problem of happiness, truth, and justice in one fell swoop—with the same few tools. We think this kind of theorizing to be an error. Evolution has insured that truth, beauty, justice, morality, and happiness are different, but interacting systems—systems that usually conflict with each other. No small set of principles that we can imagine will yield satisfactory fell swoops. Nussbaum, like Aristotle and most of the great philosophers, can be described as a "fell swoop" theorist. Perhaps the best way to characterize what we would mean by a "fell-swoop" theory is the fact that Nussbaum sees happiness/well-being/eudaimonia not as an end in itself, but a derivative of developing one's capabilities to the fullest (we will discuss her position further later in this paper). For Nussbaum, it would make no sense to talk in terms of someone having high well-being unless that person's level of well-being is a function of the development of all capabilities within that person. Her account is a *foundational* account of well-being, in that she is keen on offering the most comprehensive theory about what constitutes well-being.

So while her Capabilities Theory is quite close to our way of thinking, its very immodesty gives us pause and this paper will close by laying out these disagreements. First, however, we will situate both her approach and AH theory within the wider philosophical discussion of well-being.

Needing, Wanting, and Liking Theories of Happiness

The philosopher Derek Parfit (1984) has categorized the various conceptions of well-being into three types: desire fulfillment theories, which conceptualize well-being as

the satisfaction of revealed preferences; objective list theories, which attempt to catalog the goods required for a well-lived life; and hedonistic theories, which equates well-being with pleasurable mental states. He writes:

> What would be best for someone, or would be most in this person's interests, or would make this person's life go, for him, as well as possible? Answers to this question I call *theories about self-interest*. There are three kinds of theory. On *Hedonistic Theories*, what would be best for someone is what would make his life happiest. On *Desire-Fulfilment Theories*, what would be best for someone is what, throughout his life, would best fulfil his desires. On *Objective List Theories*, certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things
>
> (Parfit 1984, p. 493).

Geuss (2006) offers a similar categorization distinguishing between external or objectivist views, desire relative views, and overall-assessment views. We prefer the more felicitous labeling that Paul Dolan and colleagues (2006, 2007) use to combine the insight offered by Parfit and Geuss: Wanting, Needing, and Liking Theories.[5]

The first of these theory types—Wanting theory, or desire fulfillment theory—dominates mainstream economics as well as reinforcement theories within behavioral psychology. According to this account, an individual is happy if she gets what she wants. We will ignore Wanting theories in this paper, since our focus is the relation of PP theory to the Capabilities Approach, which has been shaped by Nussbaum (1999, 2000, 2006) and the economist Amartya Sen (1980, 1985, 1992, 1999, 2005). Another Positive

[5] As Angner (2007) has noted, this tri-partite distinction is seen not only in Parfit (1984) but also in Griffin (1986), and Hausman & McPherson (1996).

Psychology approach we will contrast to our theory is the one developed by psychologists Daniel Kahneman (1999), Paul Dolan (2006, 2007) and Ed Diener (1999)— who have championed the study of subjective well-being. SWB theory is a Liking theory, since subjective reports of happiness, well being, life satisfaction and the like are the dispositive criteria of happiness.

Hedonic accounts (Liking)

Simply stated, hedonism takes the view that pleasure is the only thing that is good for us, and pain is the only thing that is bad (Bentham, 1789). Philosophical theories of happiness as hedonism have largely gone out of vogue (Sumner, 1996). At an empirical level, researchers have tended to include a more nuanced range of positive and negative feelings and emotions besides pleasure and pain. One example is the day reconstruction method (DRM) used to measure the frequency and intensity of a variety of positive and negative emotions over time (Kahneman et al., 2004a). In order to assess an individuals' happiness, under Kahneman's (1999) view, we integrate all the momentary positive feelings across time. That is, since positive emotions experienced constitute the raw data of happiness, one's overall level of happiness would be calculated by adding up the total of those momentary positive emotions and subtracting the total momentary negative emotions.

Evaluative accounts (Liking)

An individual is asked "how satisfied are you with your life?" What goes into the answer? More, perhaps, than just the sum of momentary positive emotions minus the sum of momentary negative emotions. A more complete assessment of an individual's life overall incorporates both momentary feelings along with an evaluation of how his life is

going (Dolan, Peasgood & White, 2006). Such evaluative accounts incorporate both our hedonic experiences (momentary emotions) alongside our cognitive assessments of how well life is going more generally. Since both of these elements are subjective (the first being feelings and the second thoughts) this kind of account is termed subjective well-being (SWB), an umbrella term combining how we think plus how we feel about our lives (Diener et al., 1999).

Diener, who has studied SWB for over a quarter century, argues “SWB includes diverse concepts ranging from momentary moods to global judgments of life satisfaction, and from depression to euphoria” (Diener, Scollon and Lucas, 2003, p.188). What SWB captures is the individual’s own subjective assessment of his own life, and this assessment includes general satisfaction with one’s life, satisfaction with specific domains of one’s life, and the amounts of positive and negative emotion. In adopting this approach, Kahneman and Diener have different interpretations of what constitutes “happiness”: Kahneman emphasizes the “experiencing self” by making the sum of momentary emotions the barometer of well-being, while Diener sees the more reflective and evaluative “life satisfaction” as the best indicator of well-being. Dolan and White (2007) put forward an even more complicated “rich subjective well being” account, in which the happiness of a life is not just the SWB that the individual experiences, but the impact in SWB that others affected by the individual experience. On this view, Abraham Lincoln’s life was a very “happy” one, even if he himself was melancholic (Shenk, 2006) and dissatisfied, because of all the additional SWB it produced in others over history (e.g., the additional SWB of the freed slaves and their descendants).

Distinguishing AH from SWB Theories

We regard SWB theories—hedonic, evaluative, and "rich" versions-- as cousins of PP theory, but as overly simplistic. They overlook the fact that there are least four different kinds of routes to "happiness", three of which are not wholly subjective matters. PP, we stoutly maintain, is not a "happiology," and it is not entirely a matter of the "Pleasant Life." Our reasons are several:

- Nozick's experience machine, familiar to all readers of this volume. A lifetime of artificially induced positive emotions would not be chosen by many human beings. On all Liking accounts, the relevant subjective states could result from experience machines; hence the experiences—feelings and thinking even enriched by our effects on others over history—are not sufficient for the judgment that a life is happy.
- Wittgenstein's alleged last words: "Tell them it's been wonderful!" Uttered by a very dysphoric man, who while low in all senses of Liking was nevertheless high in engagement, meaning, and achievement. We take Wittgenstein's considered use of words in dead earnest.
- That positive and negative affectivity are normally distributed. This means that some people, no matter what their subjective experiences, will not feel much. These people are low in feelings and may be low in satisfaction as well; they are systematically undercounted and discriminated against by any theory or public policy (heaven forbid!) that merely totes up the amount of positive emotion and the amount of satisfaction to decide if a given life is happy or a given policy worth spending tax money on.

Introverts in particular will suffer on a policy decisions (or on judgments of how happy a life was) based on how much SWB they would experience under government policy that pays for more roller coasters or more bits of shrubbery, if the judgment is simply the integration of various SWB measures over time. Extroverts, high in SWB, will get undeserved extra votes.

- But over and above these, we think that SWB is morally and politically imprisoning (this is just about the only place where we are at all consciously prescriptive). Low SWB people (and there are major genetic determinants of capacity for SWB) are consigned to the hell of "unhappiness" on the SWB view and are even seen as disordered, e.g., "what early sexual abuse locked joy inside of you so tightly that you cannot experience it?") Because we feel that history, conceptual analysis, culture, and ethics amply justify the idea that happiness is plural and not the playground of privileged extroverts, we see our AH theory as liberating from the prison of SWB theory..

Needing Theories and Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach

Needing theories catalogue the objective list of goods required for "well-being" or a "happy" life. Dolan et al. (2006) argue that objective list accounts do not provide a formal theory of well-being; rather they offer a list of attributes and characteristics which are taken to constitute well-being. The contents of the list vary but tend to include items such as economic resources, political freedom, good health, and the ability to read.

Needing accounts are not a complete theory of well-being, but they suggest the essential means for creating well-being.

As Dolan at al. (2006) point out, the presence or absence of certain objective attributes may lead to more preferences being satisfied or better experiences in life but the value of these objective attributes is ***independent*** of these consequent effects. Therefore, the judgment about the contribution of various things (education, health etc.) towards well-being does not come from the individual but draws on theoretical and intuitive accounts of what is of value. Thus, such accounts hold that "certain things are good or bad for beings, independently in at least some cases of whether they are desired or whether they give rise to pleasurable experiences" (Chappell & Crisp 1998, p. 553). Objective list accounts measure well-being in terms of objective outcomes such as literacy rates. While some of these items may be measured from a subjective perspective, their validity for well-being is determined externally. Needing accounts are grand-fathered by Aristotle's flourishing account of well-being. Aristotle proposed a perfectionist version of well-being in which the well-being of an individual is judged by considering how close they are to reaching the potential of humankind. Aristotle's term for this, eudaimonia, has been translated variously as flourishing, happiness or well-being, That human beings will flourish (realize their potential) is the Aristotelian justification for the items on the objective list.

Nussbaum's Capabilities approach is an articulate Needing theory: that has both objective list elements and justifies the list by a flourishing account of well being. We note that Nussbaum avoids using the term "happiness" in her writings for the most part, preferring the terms "well-being" or "flourishing". We will, nevertheless, treat her

approach as a theory of "happiness." Her work shares significant similarities with Sen's Capability Approach (1999), but draws more heavily from Aristotle and Marx's conception of flourishing: *"The basic intuitive idea of my version of the capabilities approach is that we begin with a conception of the dignity of the human being, and of a life that is worthy of that dignity"* (Nussbaum, 2006, p.74).

She sees her approach as suitable for application in the realm of practical politics and policy-making, and classifies her Capabilities Approach as a project that aims "to provide the philosophical underpinnings for an account of core human entitlements that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations" (p.70). This clearly makes her approach an objective-list account, as it requires that all citizens reach a threshold level of each capability, beneath which they would not be able to achieve "truly human functioning" (p.71). She notes that

> *The capabilities approach is not intended to provide a complete account of social justice. It says nothing, for example, about how justice would treat inequalities above the threshold. (In that sense it does not answer all the questions answered by Rawls's theory.) It is an account of minimum core social entitlements, and it is compatible with different views about how to handle issues of justice and distribution that would arise once citizens are above the threshold level*
>
> (p.75)

Her approach is also explicitly a flourishing account. While her recent descriptions of the capabilities approach downplay its strong affiliation to Aristotle, her early work (1990, 1992) draws explicitly from the writings of Aristotle, and in many

ways represent a development of his ideas concerning optimal human functioning. Writing of Aristotle's conception of happiness as eudaimonia, she notes:

> By (Aristotle's) account, pleasure is just not the right thing to focus on in a normative account of the good life for a human being. Some pleasures are bad; evil people take pleasure in their evil behavior. Happiness, by contrast, is a normative notion: since it is constitutive of what we understand as "the human good life," or "a flourishing life for a human being," we cannot include evil pleasures in it.
>
> (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 62)

Her account offers a view of "happiness" as "a thick vague theory of the good" that is both empirical and normative (Nussbaum, 1992, p.214-5) and "aims to be as universal as possible" (p.215). The capabilities are presented as an "internal-essentialist account" that reveals "what the most central features of our common humanity are" (p.215). The account is thus a challenge to moral relativistic metaphysical accounts championed by postmodernist and post-colonial scholars (Jaggar, 2006).

Her current list (2006) of the ten Central Human Capabilities (with the rights necessary for each of them, following Freeman, 2007) is as follows:

1) Living a normal life span;
2) Bodily health, including rights to adequate nourishment and shelter;
3) Bodily integrity (including freedom of movement and security against assault, as well as freedom of choice in reproduction and in matters of sexual satisfaction);

4) Being able to use the senses, the imagination, and thought (including freedom of expression and religious exercise, and adequate education), and being able to have pleasurable experiences;
5) Experiencing normal human emotions, including longing, grief, anger, etc., and having emotional attachments to others (i.e., love, friendships, and the normal range of affective emotions);
6) Development of one's capacities for practical reason, including the capacity of critical reflection upon one's good or plan of life (protected by liberty of conscience and religious freedom, among other rights);
7) Capabilities for affiliation (including both having the capacities to care for and commiserate with others, and having social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation (with rights to nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, and national origin));
8) Living with other species;
9) Play, including the ability to enjoy recreational activities;
10) Control over one's environment (including rights to political participation, freedom of association, and having property rights on an equal basis with others and equal opportunities)

(Nussbaum, 2006, p76-78; adapted from Freeman, 2007)

Nussbaum asserts that the list remains open-ended and subject to revision, is vague enough to be open to a multiplicity of interpretations, stands as a "partial moral conception" without being grounded in any metaphysical tradition (her implicit

commitment to Aristotle notwithstanding), and—in line with Sen—focuses on protecting people's capabilities as opposed to functionings.

Similarities Between Capabilities Theory and AH Theory

We note a number of similarities between the AH approach and the Capabilities approach, many of which are obvious in light of the previous discussion[6]:

1) Both accounts have one similar core objective—understanding well-being and how people evaluate their lives.
2) Both approaches are pluralistic. They take (directly or indirectly) individuals' own evaluation of their own well-being into account along with other factors such as meaning, justice, engagement, and human potential.
3) Both distinguish between means and ends, and give priority to a direct assessment of ends. While this is a hallmark of the capabilities approach, Diener and Seligman (2004) also make the Aristotelian claim that "money…is a means to an end, and that end is well-being" and following Layard (2001), subsequently ask the question "After all, if economic and other policies are important because they will in the end increase well-being, why not assess well-being directly?" (p.2)
4) Both attack and offer themselves as alternatives to the resource-based and preference-based (Wanting) accounts of well-being. While the capabilities approach sees the goods-based approach as deficient because of differences in converting those goods into valuable functionings, the AH approach rejects the goods approach because of dynamic temporal adjustments of expectations to

[6] This list follows Comim's (2005) comparison of the capabilities approach with the SWB approach, although not all of Comim's comparisons are relevant to AH theory. Most of the descriptive examples are the present authors'.

goods: “Rising expectations and desires to some degree cancel the psychological benefits of greater income” (Diener and Seligman, 2004, p.7).

5) Both emphasize the importance of autonomy, mastery, and self-determination. Nussbaum (2006) notes that the capabilities approach “stresses the animal and material underpinnings of human freedom” (p.88). PP researchers (and positive psychology in general) have stressed the importance of autonomy and control, emerging as it does from Seligman’s (1975) theory of learned helplessness and Bandura’s (1993) work on self-efficacy. These notions are particularly important to the underpinnings of the Achieving Life.
6) Both approaches consider the role of emotions in assessing well-being. Positive and negative emotions are an essential part of AH assessments (Seligman, 2002), and Nussbaum (2000, 2001) has argued that emotions play an important role in shaping individuals’ preferences.
7) Both advocate methodological pluralism. Seligman (2002) has argued for measuring multiple aspects of well being, while a hallmark of the capabilities approach is its focus on multiple informational sources. The Achieving and Meaningful Lives make the methodological pluralism of AH very obvious.
8) Both approaches recognize the dangers of adaptive preferences, which could potentially bias individuals’ evaluation of their own well-being. Nussbaum (1997) characterizes adaptation as “a phenomenon in which an individual shapes her preferences to accord with (frequently narrow) set of opportunities she actually has” (p.218). Seligman also sees adaptation as one of the dangers of the SWB

approach, that is partly corrected for by using engagement and meaning criteria of happiness.

More importantly, perhaps, is the limited role that positive emotions play in both approaches: PP theory allows positive emotion as one route to happiness, but it is not a necessary route. We place equal emphasis on the Engaged Life, the Meaningful life, and the Achieving Life as paths to lasting happiness and well-being, and stress that the terms “happiness” and “well-being”, while frequently referring to feelings such as positive emotions, often refer to activities where no such emotions are felt. This emphasis parallels Nussbaum’s concerns about happiness as pleasure:

> *Another problem…is that some valuable activities are not accompanied by pleasure. Aristotle's example is the courageous warrior (perhaps a source for Wordsworth's poem) who faces death in battle for the sake of a noble end. It is absurd to say that this warrior is pleased at the prospect of death, says Aristotle. Indeed, the better his life is, the more he thinks he has to lose and the more pain he is likely to feel at the prospect of death. Nonetheless, he is acting in accordance with excellence, and is aware of that; and so he is happy. This just goes to show, says Aristotle, that pleasure does not always accompany the activities that constitute happiness.*
>
> (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 62)

So AH theory and Nussbaum’s approach both offer a broader scope for what constitutes well being than simple SWB theories would accept.

Response to Nussbaum's Critique of Positive Psychology:

Differences between the Capabilities and Authentic Happiness Approaches:

Nussbaum's approach is of all philosophical approaches to happiness, the one we are most sympathetic with. There are, however, large differences and disagreements. Many of these can be seen in Nussbaum's (2007) thoughtful critique of AH. In this section we will respond to that critique and thereby highlight how the two theories differ.

1. In spite of the important fact that both theories are "plural" in their approach to happiness, Nussbaum's is much more plural. It is a grand and ambitious "fell swoop" theory, as we noted above, and ours is very limited. For Nussbaum (as for Aristotle) happiness, justice, truth, right action, public policy are all in alignment. For Aristotle, Eudaimonia requires right action: happiness and virtue are the same issue, and happiness would thus be characterized by the attainment of virtue and purity and the excellence of character. This seems an overly demanding constraint, Kraut (1979) felicitously dismisses Aristotle's conception of happiness or eudaimonia as being too rigid in its standard in evaluating individuals' ideal lives. Measuring someone's "eudaimon" or happiness by the standard of "the ideal life for all human beings" (p.196) would seem to severely exclude most of us from happiness. Nussbaum's approach, like Aristotle's is a theory of happiness, along with being a theory of right action, justice, and politics.

   For us, human psychology comes in symbiotic modular systems that are not well-aligned, that have evolved for quite different functions and that often conflict and must be played off against one another. Ours is not a theory of right and wrong, of good and evil, of truth and falsity, or of public policy. It is just a theory

of happiness. In our view it is possible, but not likely, for an individual to be "happy", i.e., to have a pleasant life and/or an engaged life and/or a meaningful life and/or an achieving life, but be wrong-headed, evil, deluded, incorrect, and even anti-social. The limited nature of our theory is a consequence in part of its descriptive, as opposed to prescriptive nature. We are content to merely describe what is ubiquitously prescribed about well being.

It is not our intention to instruct people or governments in what they **should** do; rather given that an individual (or an institution) wants and intends and values some course of action which he thinks will lead to positive emotion, or engagement, or meaning or achievement, the theory instructs him only on the likelihood, consequences, and correlates of this course of action.

2. Related to this, Nussbaum says "…Seligman's diagnosis of Americans is that they are too anxious and unhappy, and so he proposes a public policy focus in part as a corrective." This is not quite our view. There is a great deal (an epidemic, even) of depression in America and every wealthy nation today. As far as we can judge the values and intentions of these nations are that depression ought to be lowered, (as do we, but on grounds external to the AH theory—we personally value high productivity and good physical health and depression interferes with both). AH does not claim that depression ought to be lowered; although we agree with this desire, but on grounds external to the theory. AH merely instructs policy makers in the evidence about what works and what does not work to lower depression..

We do advocate a "public policy focus" on well being—more precisely we advocate the measuring of positive emotion plus engagement plus meaning plus

achievement in entire populations—not because there is too much depression or anxiety in given nations, because we believe that public policy should be driven not just by wealth, but how we can use of wealth and national policies to achieve more "happiness" in just this fourfold sense for its citizens. This advocacy is about as close as we get to anything prescriptive.

In a similar vein, Nussbaum (2007) tells the story of meeting David Trimble (the man-of-sorrows politician) and John LeCarre (the complacent and cheery spy novelist) and contrasts the desirability of living their lives. She alleges that Seligman "…gives the following advice: to the extent that a career offers secure prospects of happiness, and still contains some valuable activity, that career is to be preferred to the career that has a large risk of reversal and misery." We offer no such advice. How an individual values certain goals about injustice and about meaning and what weight she puts on positive emotion or pain or engagement (or sex or gourmet food for that matter) is none of our business, theoretically. The only advice we offer is knowledge about what courses of action are more or less likely to lead to positive emotion or engagement or meaning or achievement. It is entirely possible that individuals could value peace in Northern Ireland or the hoarding of pancakes in their attics more than their own positive emotion or their own relief of suffering. We would not, on theoretical grounds, speak against such a set of values. We could, if the AH project succeeds empirically, inform them about the likelihood that such courses of action would lead to more or less of their own positive emotion, or engagement, or meaning, or achievement..

Our stand on a pig-satisfied versus Socrates-dissatisfied (cf., Nussbaum 2007) is just the same: Whatever (what an ugly concept)! We do, it so happens, value a dissatisfied Socrates more, but on grounds external to the theory.—we think that knowing the truth is of great value to us. But ours is not a theory of value, only a theory of positive emotion, of engagement, of meaning, and now of accomplishment and how best to achieve them.

3. Is the Happy Warrior happy in Seligman's theory, Nussbaum (2007) wonders? Must one have positive emotion **and** valuable activity conjointly? PP theory claims there are four different roads to happiness, each of which has a claim on the term "happy." The Happy Warrior strides down two or three of them, engagement and meaning and achievement, even if he is in great pain, full of negative emotion, pessimistic that he will survive, and is devoid of positive emotion. The Happy Warrior is decidedly happy (and this is a pillar of our sympathy with Nussbaum's theory as opposed to SWB theory). One need not have both positive emotion **and** right action to have a claim on the term "happy," one can merely have positive emotion—although the value of being entitled to the descriptor "happy" does not amount to much in our view, since we seek to dissolve the "happy" question into four more manageable questions.
4. "What emotions are positive?" within PP theory Nussbaum (2007) asks. She persuades us, of course, that negative emotions, emotions that feel bad, are often appropriate and constructive. We should grieve, rather than laugh at the funerals of people we love. We totally agree with Nussbaum, but this is not a thorn in the side of AH theory.

Taken in total isolation, emotions that feel good are positive and those that feel bad are negative, but this is not the definition of positive in AH theory. "*We define "neutral" as the set of all circumstances, 0's, any member of which when added to any event, does not make that configuration more preferred or dispreferred (approached or avoided) and does not increase or decrease the felt emotion about that events. Configurations that are preferred to 0's (neutrality operationalized) so defined (and that elicit more subjective positive emotion, e.g., pleasure, happiness, joy, satisfaction than the O's) are positive, and circumstances that are dispreferred to 0's so defined (and that elicit more subjective negative emotion than the O's) are negative.* " So at a funeral, the configuration of crying plus everything else is preferred to not crying plus everything else, (and not laughing plus everything else is preferred to laughing plus everything else) so this is a case in which an emotion that feels bad is preferred to its absence, hence positive, and an emotion that feels good is negative.

Just the same reasoning applies to "Seligman, in particular, thinks that it is good to promote good-feeling emotions and to minimize bad-feeling emotions, often by thinking hopeful thoughts. But sometimes having a hopeful take on the bad thing seems to trivialize it" (Nussbaum, 2007). Only under the conditions of all else equal (total isolation) are hopeful "takes" desirable. To the extent that a hopeful take leads to even worse situations, it is not good. Seligman (1991) argues that flexible optimism, not optimism all the time, leads to far better results. We don't want optimistic airline pilots.

Conclusion: Can Capabilities and SWB Be Reconciled or At Least Learn From Each Other?

As we noted earlier, there are a number of salient similarities between the Capabilities Approach and PP theory. Moreover, there is a parallel between Nussbaum's commitment to an Aristotelian conception of flourishing and our focus on four paths to happiness that need not involve positive emotions. Both Nussbaum and PP theory offer a more complete account of "happiness", than the more parsimonious accounts offered by Wanting theories and by SWB theories.

We do not share Nussbaum's commitment to ten specific, over-arching capabilities. Despite her claim that a publicly held conception of the good should be informed by what that society's citizens hold to be valuable, we worry that her own account is rooted more in local and personal intuitions rather than a ubiquitous consensus. This reservation entails that further reconciling AH theory with the specifics of her approach would commit us to a "fell-swoop" account of the human good, a move that any thorough-going descriptive theory would not want to make (Seligman, 2002; Kendler, 2000). We have doubts, moreover, about what Nussbaum claims the Capabilities are in service of. For Nussbaum, the capabilities are fundamental entitlements that allow "dignity" and "optimal human functioning." We find these terms mysterious , or at minimum in need of further explication. Our sympathy with the capabilities stems from the place that such capabilities might have in AH theory: for us they are plausible conditions that enable positive emotion, engagement, meaning, and achievement.—and nothing more.

Despite our differences, and despite the fact that Nussbaum has mischaracterized some of AH theory, we happily acknowledge that she makes a persuasive case for a liberal perfectionist account of human well being that is both stimulating and provocative. She is one of the few thinkers committed to developing substantive accounts of well-being and human rights, and her work stands as a serious challenge to moral relativism in advocating a universal framework for assessing the quality of life across the world. Her contribution is a significant one, and we hope that these comments, made from a sympathetic, scientific perspective, will serve to further this discourse.

References

Allport, G. (1961) Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston

Alkire, S. (2002). "Dimensions of Development." *World Development,* 30(2), 181–205.

Chappell, Tim and Roger Crisp (1998) 'Utilitarianism,' in Edward Craig (Ed.) *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 9 (London: Routledge), pp. 551-557.

Clark, D.A. (2000). Perceptions of Development: Some Evidence from the Western Cape. *SALDRU Working Paper 88*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.

Clark, D.A. (2003). Concepts and Perceptions of Human Well-Being: Some Evidence from South Africa. *Oxford Development Studies*, 31(2),.173–96.

Clark, D.A. (2005). Sen's Capability Approach and the Many Spaces of Human Well-Being. *Journal of Developmental Studies*, 41(8), 1339-1368.

Clark, D.A. (2006). The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances. In Clark, D.A. (ed.). *The Elgar Companion to Development Studies*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p.1-18.

Comim, F. (2005). Capabilities and Happiness: Potential Synergies. *Review of Political Economy*, LXIII(2), 161-176.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). *Flow: The psychology of optimal experience*. New York: Harper Collins.

Dewey, J. (1900). Psychology and Social Practice. *Psychological Review* 7: 121.

Danner, D.D., Snowden, D.A., Friesen, W.V. (2001). Positive emotions in early life and

longevity: Findings from the Nun Study. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80, 801–813.

Diener, E. (2000). Subjective Well-Being: the science of happiness and a proposal for a national index. *American Psychologist* 55(1): 34 – 43.

Diener, E. (2006). Guidelines for National Indicators of Subjective Well-Being and Ill-Being. *Applied Research in Quality of Life*, 10, 1-7.

Diener, E. (2007). Happiness: On the Shoulders of Giants. Manuscript in preparation.

Diener, E. and Suh, E., (1997). Measuring quality of life: Economic, social and subjective indicators. *Social Indicators Research*, 40, 189–216.

Diener, E., Suh, E., Lucas, R. and Smith, H. (1999) 'Subjective Well-Being: three decades of progress. *Psychological Bulletin* 125(2): 276 – 302.

Diener, E., Scollon, C. and Lucas, R. (2003). The Evolving Concept of Subjective Well-Being: the multifaceted nature of happiness. *Advances in Cell Aging and Gerontology*, 15: 187 – 219.

Diener, E. and Seligman, M. (2004). Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest* 5(1): 1 – 31.

Doyal, L. and I. Gough (1991). *A Theory of Human Need*. London: MacMillan.

Easterlin, R. (1974). Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? In Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder, (eds.). *Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz.* New York: Academic Press, Inc.

Easterlin, R. (2003). Explaining Happiness. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 100:19, 11176-11183.

Fredrickson, B.L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The

broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. *American Psychologist*, 56, 218–226.

Fredrickson, B. L. (2000, March 7). Cultivating positive emotions to optimize health and well-being. *Prevention & Treatment*, *3* Article 1. Retrieved March 21, 2006, from http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:8457/prevention/

Fredrickson, B. L., & Branigan, C. (2005). Positive emotions broaden the scope of attention and thought-action repertoires. *Cognition and Emotion*, *19*, 313–332.

Fredrickson, B. L., & Joiner, T. (2002). Positive emotions trigger upward spirals toward emotional well-being. *Psychological Science*, *13*, 172–175.

Fredrickson, B. L., & Levenson, R. W. (1996). Positive emotions speed recovery from the cardiovascular sequelae of negative emotions. *Cognition and Emotion*, *12*, 191–220.

Fredrickson, B. L., & Losada, M. (2005). Positive affect and the complex dynamics of human flourishing. *American Psychologist*, *60*, 678–686.

Fredrickson, B. L., Tugade, M. M., Waugh, C. E., & Larkin, G. R. (2003). What good are positive emotions in crises? A prospective study of resilience and emotions following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *84*, 365–376.

Freeman, S. (2007). Frontiers of Justice: The Capabilities Approach vs. Contractarianism. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Gasper, D. (2004). *The Ethics of Development*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Griffin, J. (1986). *Well-Being: Its meaning, measurement and moral importance.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Irwin, F.W. (1971). Intentional behavior and motivation: A cognitive theory. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Jaggar, A.M. (2006). Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaum's Methods of Justifying the Capabilities. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14(3), 301-322.

Kahneman, D. (2000). Experienced utility and objective happiness: A moment-based approach. In D. Kahneman, & A. Tversky, (Eds.) Choices, values and frames. New York: Cambridge University Press and the Russell Sage Foundation

Kahneman, D., Diener, E. and Schwarz, N. (1999) *Well-Being: the foundations of hedonic psychology.* New York: Russell Sage.

Kendler, H.H. (2000) *Amoral Thoughts About Morality*. Springfield: Charles Thomas.

Lyubomirsky, S., King, L. A., & Diener, E. (2005). The benefits of frequent positive affect. *Psychological Bulletin, 131,* 803-855.

Lyubomirsky, S., Sheldon, K. M., & Schkade, D. (2005). Pursuing happiness: The architecture of sustainable change. *Review of General Psychology*, *9*, 111–131.

McAdam, D. P., Diamond, A., de St. Aubin, E., & Mansfield, E. (1997). Stories of commitment: The psychological construction of generative lives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *72*, 678–694

McCullough, M. E. (2000). Forgiveness as a human strength: Conceptualization, measurement, and links to well-being. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, *19*, 43–55.

Moneta, G. B., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). The effect of perceived challenges and skills on the quality of subjective experience. *Journal of Personality*, *64*, 275–310.

Myers, D. G. (1992). *The pursuit of happiness: Who is happy—and why*. New York: William Morrow.

Nakamura, J., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2002). The concept of flow. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), *Handbook of positive psychology* (pp. 89–105). New York: Oxford University Press.

Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.

Nozick, R. (1997). *Socratic puzzles*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

Nussbaum, M.C. (1990). Aristotelian social democracy. In R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald Mara and Henry Richardson (eds). *Liberalism and the Good*. New York: Routledge.

Nussbaum, M.C. (1992). Human functioning and social justice: In defense of Aristotelian essentialism. *Political Theory*, 20, 202–46.

Nussbaum, M.C. (1997). *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M.C. (1999). *Sex and Social Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M.C. (2000). *Women and Human Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M.C. (2001). *Upheavals of Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M.C. (2003). Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice. *Feminist Economics*, 9(2-3), 33-59.

Nussbaum, M.C. (2006). *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species*

Nussbaum, M.C. (2007). Who is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy Poses Questions to

Psychology. Paper presented to the Happiness and the Law conference, University of Chicago, June 2007.

Parfit, D. (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Pennebaker, J. W. (1993). Putting stress into words: Health, linguistic, and therapeutic

Peterson, C. (2006). *A Primer in Positive Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Peterson, C. and Seligman, M.E.P. (2004). *Character Strengths and Virtues: A Classification*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, J. (2001). *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*. Cambridge: Belknap Press.

Rogers, C. R. (1951). *Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implications, and theory*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Ryan, R.M. and Deci, E.L. (2006). Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will? *Journal of Personality*, 74(6), 1557-1585.

Ryan, R.M. and Deci, E.L. (2001). On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 52, 141-166.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. *American Psychologist*, *55*, 68–78

Scanlon, T.M. (1996). The Status of Well-Being. in G. B. Peterson (Ed.). The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. 19 (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press).

Sen, A.K. (1980). “Equality of What?” In S.M. McMurrin (ed.). *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Sen, A.K. (1985) Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: the Dewey Lectures. The Journal of Philosophy LXXXII(4): 169 – 223.

Sen, A.K. (1992). *Inequality Reexamined*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sen, A.K. (1993). Capability and Well-being. In M.C. Nussbaum and A.K. Sen (eds). *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sen, A.K. (1993). Positional Objectivity. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22(2): 126-145.

Sen, A.K. (1999). *Development As Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sen, A.K. (2004). Elements of a Theory of Human Rights. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 32(4), 315-356.

Sen, A.K. (2005). Human Rights and Capabilities. *Journal of Human Development*, 6(2), 151-66.

Seligman, M. E. P. (1991). *Learned optimism*. New York: Knopf.

Seligman, M.E.P. and Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive Psychology: An Introduction. *American Psychologist* 55: 1-20.

Seligman, M.E.P. (2002). Authentic Happiness. New York: The Free Press.

Seligman, M.E.P. (2002). Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention, and Positive Therapy. In Snyder, C.R. and Lopez, S. (eds). Handbook of Positive Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Seligman, M. E. P., Steen, T. A., Park, N., & Peterson, C. (2005). Positive psychology

progress: Empirical validation of interventions. *American Psychologist*, *60*, 410–421.

Seligman, M. E. P., Rashid, T., & Parks, A.C. (2006). Positive Psychotherapy. *American Psychologist*, *61,* 774-788.

Shenk, J.W. (2006). *Lincoln's Melancholy: How Depression Challenged a President and Fueled His Greatness*. New York: Mariner Books.

Snyder, C. R. (2000). *Handbook of hope: Theory, measures and applications*. San Francisco: Academic Press.

Tugade, M. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). Resilient individuals use positive emotion to bounce back from negative emotional experiences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *86*, 320–333.